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From the point of view of the cognitive dynamicist the organization of brain circuitry into
assemblies defined by their synchrony at particular (and precise) oscillation frequencies
is important for the correct correlation of all independent cortical responses to the
different aspects of a given complex thought or object. From the point of view of
anyone operating complex mechanical systems, i.e., those comprising independent
components that are required to interact precisely in time, it follows that the precise
timing of such a system is essential – not only essential but measurable, and scalable. It
must also be reliable over observations to bring about consistent behavior, whatever that
behavior is. The catastrophic consequence of an absence of such precision, for instance
that required to govern the interference engine in many automobiles, is indicative of
how important timing is for the function of dynamical systems at all levels of operation.
The dynamics and temporal considerations combined indicate that it is necessary to
consider the operating characteristic of any dynamical, cognitive brain system in terms,
superficially at least, of oscillation frequencies. These may, themselves, be forensic
of an underlying time-related taxonomy. Currently there are only two sets of relevant
and necessarily systematic observations in this field: one of these reports the precise
dynamical structure of the perceptual systems engaged in dynamical binding across
form and time; the second, derived both empirically from perceptual performance data,
as well as obtained from theoretical models, demonstrates a timing taxonomy related to
a fundamental operator referred to as the time quantum. In this contribution both sets of
theory and observations are reviewed and compared for their predictive consistency.
Conclusions about direct comparability are discussed for both theories of cognitive
dynamics and time quantum models. Finally, a brief review of some experimental data
measuring sensitivity to visual information presented to the visual blind field (blindsight),
as well as from studies of temporal processing in autism and schizophrenia, indicates
that an understanding of a precise and metrical dynamic structure may be very important
for an operational understanding of perception as well as more general cognitive function
in psychopathology.
Keywords: time quantum (TQ), taxonomic model of quantal timing (TQM), oscillation, cortical dynamics, abnormal
cognition
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DYNAMICAL CONSTANTS AND TIME
UNIVERSALS IN COGNITION
Successful cognition aims to provide as narrow a range of
responses to a specific stimulus as possible and in so doing
allow for contexts that are both immediate as well as those
that are temporally disjunct. A good example of the latter is
the ability to return service in tennis: In order to place the
racket at precisely the correct position in space at the right
time (and with the correct angular displacement and degree of
force), the player has to – a priori – judge the future position
of the tennis ball by calculating current velocity, which entails
a spatiotemporal location prediction by means of run-time
estimations. They may thus prepare their successful response
on the basis of this information. In the spatial domain, a given
stimulus may exhibit a wide variety of defining features that
require assignment to their ‘object’ alongside segregation from
the features defining surrounding stimuli. The problem to be
solved by cognition is in both cases similar, except for the tennis
player the ‘binding’ of different responses must occur over time to
ensure that the eventual velocity code and response are veridical
and successful. For successful figure-ground segmentation, there
is not necessarily the same emphasis in coding over time
(although maintaining identity irrespective of observer or object
movement is also a factor for consideration). What is important
in this instance is the correct assignment of features to objects.
Of course cognition also includes the correct deployment of
memory and use of language, and includes the mechanisms and
processes responsible for the deployment of attentional resources.
The discussions that follow may apply to any and all instances
of cognition but this contribution will focus on those known to
operate during perception.
The use of technologies such as the electroencephalogram
(EEG) as well as the use of multi-unit single cell recordings,
both of which allow for good temporal resolution in time-
series data, has encouraged more widespread consideration of
the dynamics of brain function as the operating characteristic
of successful cognition. For instance, it is probably now
widely held that the rhythmic phase synchronization of
neural activity at frequencies in the EEG gamma band (i.e.,
30–70 Hz) brings about the organization of visual events, in
particular, the ‘binding’ of individual visual features to form
perceptual wholes (Gray, 1999; Singer, 1999). Thus, the term
binding refers both to ‘perceptual binding’ or the necessary
relation between features that go together to form a wholistic,
object-related representation (e.g., as defined in Treisman
and Gelade, 1980), or the term refers to the mechanism by
which neurons dedicated to responding to particular feature
attributes (contrast orientation or direction of movement for
example) combine to form assemblies. The two definitions
are often treated as synonymous and theoretically, binding by
synchronization is assumed to be isomorphic with the binding
of feature attributes as introduced in our second example above.
Although there is an argument that these definitions require
careful reconsideration (see Elliott et al., 2006), this theory
is now supported by a very considerable literature describing
physiological studies.
THE TEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF
CODING IN VISION
The strengths of the physiological binding hypothesis lie in
addressing a number of key theoretical problems: assembly
coding is known to be necessary for neurons to code specific
visual contrasts (oriented lines, edges, etc.) as opposed to simple
changes in contrast, while the segregation of features defining
figure from ground is achieved by virtue of neurons participating
in different assemblies defined by a unique phase in their firing
patterns. In this way features coding an object may be coded
by virtue of oscillatory firing at one particular phase, while all
features defining ‘ground’ or the context of the object may be
responded to by firing at other phases of a given oscillatory
firing regimen. This avoids what is referred to as a ‘superposition
catastrophe’ when everything becomes coded in the context of
a single assembly code, leading to there being no means of
differentiating (for example) figure from ground.
Clear in these instances, and similar to the second example
above, of returning a tennis serve, is that there needs to
be a particular temporal code which permits two or more
simultaneous assemblies to be active and not confusable. Also
entailed is the need for this code to be precise, and almost
certainly, regularly precise. Consider not only the coordination
of perception and action, or the issue of differentiation of
perceptual materials, if the brain functions as a machine,
providing consistent output to match regularities in its input,
it must also operate in the manner of a complex mechanical
system, i.e., a system comprising independent components that
are required to interact precisely in time. It follows that the
precise timing of such a system is essential, not only essential
but measurable, scalable (if the system has several interacting
parts, each doing tasks of a different scale), and reliable over
observations. The catastrophic consequence of an absence of such
precision, for instance, that required to govern the interference
engine in many automobiles, is indicative of how important
timing is for the function of dynamical systems at all levels of
operation. The implications of this for the timing of psychological
processes in psychopathologies will be returned to later in this
paper.
The question of precision seems difficult for physiological
data for several reasons. First, studies of neural synchronization
often do not report perfect phase alignment between oscillatory
neuronal responses but may report separations in time of up to
20ms between the ‘synchronized’ responses of neurons in visual
cortex (see e.g., Gray et al., 1989 for data and Singer, 1993 for
review). This leads to approximation but not precision regarding
the timing of the neural response. Second, and while techniques
such as EEG allow a measure of the field potential, even if all other
issues with the EEG were resolved, as regards timing precision,
these measures are still of insufficient resolution to develop a
precise model of the dynamics in the cognitive microstructures
operating during recording. A third issue regards theory, which
has from time to time concerned itself with the relationship
between the timing of the neural response to the stimulus or other
non-proximal event. A recent focus has involved discussion of
the relationship between small eye movements (microsaccades)
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and induced cortical gamma activity, suggesting that recordings
of cortical gamma-band activity are essentially related to the
frequency of muscular movements in the eye (Yuval-Greenberg
et al., 2008, see Hassler et al., 2011 for contradictory evidence).
It is also suggested that a link exists between evoked-gamma
(i.e., event-time locked) activity and visual grouping (see Tallon-
Baudry, 2009; Martinovic and Busch, 2011 for reviews). This
is controversial as other EEG studies, supported by a body
of evidence in the physiological literature, generally holds
oscillatory-gamma activity to be necessarily unrelated to the
phase of stimulus events in order to allow for neurons to respond
with a temporal code that is independent of stimulus events (see
Pantev, 1995 as well as Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand, 1999; Fries
et al., 2007, for reviews).
It is generally true to say that for the most part
neurophysiology assumes a one-directional causal flow and
so ignores psychological data. There are two sets of evidence
though that indicate a very fine precision in the architecture of
the psychophysical response, and at least one of these sets can
be linked directly to neural synchronization via oscillation. The
question addressed by this paper is of their commonality.
The two sets of data to be linked concern the taxonomic time-
quantum model of Geissler (1985, 1992) and more particularly,
the empirical support for this model provided by Geissler et al.
(1999) and Geissler and Kompass (2001). The time-quantum
model postulates (in principle all) successful cognition to depend
upon interactions between processes according to a very precise
temporal architecture based upon a fundamental time unit of
around 4.5–4.6 ms. The first set of data derives from the studies
described by Elliott and Müller (1998, 2000, 2004).
Elliott and Müller designed a paradigm in which the separate
features that go together to form an object (in this instance the
set of ‘L’ shaped corner junctions that go together to define a
‘square’ perceptual arrangement, hereafter referred to as a ‘target’)
were primed by presentation of crosses presented simultaneously
in square arrangement. Both priming crosses and target corner
junctions were presented as one element of larger priming and
target displays of crosses or corner junctions (respectively, see
Elliott and Müller, 1998 for details). Priming displays (hereafter
referred to as a ‘premask’ display) were dynamic in that crosses
were divided over four successively presented image frames
presented repeatedly and at frequencies in the EEG gamma
band. The crosses presented in square arrangement (hereafter
the prime) were presented as one of the four image frames and
on half of all trials. The four priming crosses were therefore
presented simultaneously. The premask display was presented
for a period usually of 600 ms and was followed by a second
display that on half of trials included a target. Elliott and Müller
(1998, 2000) showed that priming stimulus presentation, below
detection thresholds for premasks presented faster than an image
frame presentation rate of 21 Hz, lead to faster detection reaction
times (RTs) to a subsequently presented target than when the
premask display did not contain a prime. The priming stimulus
is defined as a prime because it was not found to cue target
presentation.
Elliott and Müller (1998) identified a specificity in priming
to premask displays that flickered at 40 Hz. Elliott and Müller
(2004) subsequently introduced data from premasks presented at
frequencies (in single Hertz steps) over the range 30–50 Hz. From
these experiments, they concluded priming effects were not to be
confined to 40 Hz, but instead occurred for premask matrices
flickering at 33 Hz, 39–40 Hz, and at 46–47 Hz. Described in
terms of a ‘Generalized Phase Angle Hypothesis’ (GPAH), Elliott
and Müller (2004) observed that priming occurs for primes
presented within premask rhythms that would all be in phase
alignment at regular 148 ms intervals. This suggests modulation
of the premask-presentation rhythm by a slower (EEG theta)
rhythm estimated at that time to be 6.75 Hz, with which the
premask-matrix frequencies would share a common phase angle.
The GPAH predicts that, for a given priming frequency f and
corresponding period duration t = 1/f, facilitation reoccurs at
every time point.
J(t) = t(nt + 0.5)− T
where nt is an integer multiplier of frequency and T denotes
a quantal time delay constant. The term +0.5 accounts for the
observation that, when f = 40 Hz, priming occurs optimally for
targets presented at times equivalent to phase angles of 180◦
relative to the rhythm of premask-matrix presentation (see Elliott
and Müller, 2000, 2004, for full explanations).
Prime generation under the circumstances in which regularly
ordered stimulus frequencies interact in phase with a slower
perhaps endogenous rhythm is only one part of the story. An
analysis of the same dataset, published earlier by Kompass
and Elliott (2001) found that priming varied in magnitude (or
priming was or was-not present) for frequencies according to
the time of target presentation expressed in terms of the phase
of the premask-matrix presentation frequency (referred to in
terms of a ‘Return Phase Hypothesis’ or RPH for oscillatory
priming). In fact priming was maximal for targets presented at
a time shortly ahead of the premask-matrix presentation phase
at which the priming-stimulus would have been presented if
premask-matrix presentation had continued. This indicates the
prime to be a cognitive response that can develop in advance
of the priming stimulus, most likely facilitated by the rhythmic
nature of premask-matrix presentation. On the assumption
that an advanced prime response, develops in ‘anticipation’ of
target presentation, the prime may be considered ‘protentive’
in the sense used by Husserl et al. (1893–1917), to denote a
psychological event that occurs in advance of, is related to,
and persists into the period of time at which a subsequent
psychological event occurs.
Elliott (2014) provided analyses of nine datasets covering
priming frequencies across the range 27–68 Hz with the
following conclusions: priming in the sense of anticipatory
coding (as described by the RPH) occurs maximally when
priming frequencies are in phase with a more precisely estimated
6.69 Hz rhythm, but not when priming frequencies and the slower
rhythm are out-of-phase. When out of phase with the 6.69 Hz
rhythm, targets are primed when presented at phases that are
synchronous with or slightly lag priming-stimulus presentation
phase. On this basis, Elliott concluded that an anticipatory
coding of the target occurs when the oscillation imposed by
the stimulus (or the oscillation at which stimulus-coding occurs
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spontaneously) is aligned in phase with the phase of the slower
oscillation. Elliott also showed that this anticipatory code is
not generated when this interaction in phase does not occur.
It cannot be concluded that this interaction is particular to
6.75 Hz; mathematically several other frequencies may align
phases at other times, which allows for other slow rhythms to be
instrumental for anticipatory coding.
The second set of psychophysical evidence refers to a theory
of quantal timing (TQM) originally advanced by Geissler (1985,
1992) and re-evaluated against empirical data by Geissler et al.
(1999) and Geissler and Kompass (2001). Geissler et al. (1999)
discovered a discrete structure in a set of preferred inter-stimulus
intervals (ISIs) at 4.5, 9.5, 18, 22, 27, 37, 44, 54, 107, and
145 ms, for the shift from apparent motion between two spatially
separated but independent and temporally asynchronous changes
in brightness, to the perception of flicker between these changes.
These intervals also exhibit close relation to a set of periods
extracted from von Békésy’s (1936) data. von Békésy (1936)
discovered a series of 11 local invariances in the absolute intensity
threshold for sound as a function of frequency. In his experiment,
frequency was increased continuously from below threshold
until the stimulus became noticeable while intensity was kept
constant. Local invariances were defined as points at which the
stimulus becomes noticeable at the same frequency for different
intensities. For instance, at 18 Hz the same point of transition
was observed at six levels of intensity. Geissler and Kompass
(2001) note that the observation of multiple distinct periods
permits the extraction of further regularities. Of most importance
are regularities in temporal spacing between periods for which
there is a higher probability of perceptual change. Analysis
reveals (with one exception) that these periods (reciprocals to
the frequencies used by von Békésy) may be grouped into three
subseries of approximate harmonic doublings: 222, 111, 55, and
26 ms; 133, 91, and 45.5 ms; 133, 72, and 36 ms.
Statistically, every member of these sets exhibits a close-to
integer ratio to at least two other set members, indicating their
structural relation in time. This structure is a fundamental tenet
for Geissler’s (1985, 1992, 2004, 2009) and Geissler and Kompass
(2001) taxonomic model of TQM. TQM is a hierarchical model
of related temporal intervals derived initially from inspection
of von Békésy’s data. The notion of a “time quantum,” derives
from meta-analysis of these data, which suggests that each period
is a multiple of a lower common divisor in the range 4.5–
4.6 ms. Geissler postulates this value as representing an absolute
quantum Q0, of which, multiples called operative quanta are
linked. In the context of apparent motion, this architecture
would permit a processing system to develop which possesses
coherence across different scales; from the signaling of temporal
discontinuous, but nonetheless simple, contrasts, to the mental
representation of an interval.
Besides proposing Q0 (which corresponds to 220 Hz in the
frequency domain), TQM differs from concepts of a central
clock mechanism (e.g., Stroud, 1955) by virtue of the assumption
of a limited coherence resulting from increasing loss of phase
precision over time. This assumption is derived from the
principle that mental timing obeys a form of Weber fractioning.
TQM leads consequently to a conceptual overlay between quantal
and Weber Laws – in which it is necessary to increase the
operative quantum Q when an interval M ∗ Q is exceeded.
This idea is supported by the results presented by Kristofferson
(1980) who investigated discrimination of short intervals after
prolonged training. He showed that such an overlay actually
exists, while the estimate M == 30 for the concatenation of
operative quanta is based upon Teghtsoonian’s (1971) finding
that, on a subjective scale, the Weber fraction, often called
Ekman’s Constant, is about 1/30.
A third basic assumption of TQM is the formation of
hierarchies of entrained intervals. In other words, intervals are
the periods of a given oscillation and the TQM is a model of
interrelated oscillations. The idea of a hierarchy suggests that
preferences should exist for multiples of the quantum, composed
of common divisors of integers such as 24, which are inherent in
the empirical data on discrete timing (Geissler, 1992; Kompass,
1999). The experiment on long-range Beta apparent motion
(Geissler et al., 1999) is the first in which elementary TQM
predictions were confirmed by experimental data. What are
referred to by Geissler et al. (1999) as independent critical ISIs
(cISI) are very close to multiples (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 24, and
32) of a period of 4.49 ms. A second empirical derivation of Q0
based on measures of local variation of ISI has given an estimate
of 4.56 ms (Kompass, 1999). The set of all cISI spans the interval
[0, 32 ∗ Q0] and this is in support of the hypothesis of limited
coherence with M = 32.
Quantal timing, thus describes a psychophysical processing
architecture based around operative quanta. These quanta are
a set of different processing intervals that relate numerically
through their multiplicative relations with a fundamental interval
Q0. Operationally, operative quanta rescale due to the phase
coherence of any given operative quantum persisting for no more
than 32 or 33 cycles. After this the operative quantum rescales to
another operative quantum in a manner empirically consistent
with Weber fractioning. Different processing intervals associated
with different quanta may serve different psychophysical or
cognitive functions. It might be assumed that more complex
cognition (associated, for example, with perception of apparent
motion) is a concatenation of less complex cognitive events (e.g.,
a discrete sampling, at lower scale, of contrasts over time and
space). Based upon this idea, as well as the idea, common with
the physiological binding hypothesis, that neural oscillations are
responsible for cognition, a ‘dynamic binding’ of the different
process states is a fundamental concept within TQM.
This conceptualization is thus strongly suggestive of a
relationship between TQM and the models arising from Elliott
and Müller’s research in which the notion of a temporal
binding is central. However statistically, this relationship requires
the following correspondences: (i) establishing a constant link
between a value of Q0 in the range 4.5–4.65 ms and the priming
frequencies, which for protentive coding are 32.25–33.5 Hz;
38–40 Hz; 45.75–46.5 Hz; 53.25–53.75 Hz; 59–60.75 and 65.75–
67.5 Hz; (ii) establishing, if not a hierarchical relationship, a
relationship in which frequencies at different scales can be seen
to interact to bring about a particular psychophysical effect and
finally (iii), from this set of data establish a relationship pointing
toward a limit cycle of 32 ∗ Q0.
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The slow frequency with which prime frequencies interact to
bring about protentive coding (6.69 Hz) is 33 cycles of a period
of a hypothetical Q0 of 4.53 ms, an estimate very close to that
made by Kompass (1999) and at a multiple which would suggest
a point in time of maximum coherence for Q if it is assumed
that 33 == 0 with respect to coherence strength of a cyclical
system subject to systematic coherence decay over 32 cycles. This
would appear to satisfy correspondence (iii), although this applies
only in the case where the prime brings about protentive coding,
as is evident when a Lomb-Scargle periodogram is applied to
the data (this is a method for finding periodicity in irregularly
sampled or sparse data. It is analogous to the more familiar
Fourier Power Spectral Density used for detecting periodicity in
regularly sampled data). The absence of a significant relationship
between priming and a slower frequency when primes occur
in synchrony with, or following the phase of priming-stimulus
presentation (see Elliott, 2014 for a more detailed discussion)
appears to preclude consideration of correspondence (iii) from
all instances of priming. This also indicates that priming may
occur without interaction across frequencies with the corollary
that where correspondence (iii) applies correspondence (ii) may
also apply (as in the case of protentive prime formation), but
where it does not, correspondence (ii) cannot apply.
The correspondence of particular frequencies to TQM = 4.53
is less straightforward because of unknown error in the estimates
of the frequencies themselves and TQM, and, as a direct
consequence the value associated with 33 cycles of TQM. There
is also an issue concerning which frequencies should be taken
into consideration. Reference to Elliott (2014) shows that the
magnitude of priming is non-uniformly distributed over small
bands from which one might assume either the mode or the
central moment to represent the largest measure of successful
priming. This compares against the idea that interactions in
frequency, in which, in a hierarchical system one type of process
might transform into another and would do so at a point in time
equivalent to the origin of the process. If priming were to be
distributed non-uniformly over a single frequency domain this
could indicate the zero-crossings, or the frequencies in between
bands of priming to be important. Empirically this may be less
likely given the interaction of priming frequencies occurs at
149 ms (so with the slow 6.69 Hz rhythm). Combining data
from Elliott and Müller (2004) and Elliott (2014) and assuming
the sets of priming frequencies center on 32.75 Hz; 39.5 Hz;
46.38 Hz; 53.39 Hz; 59.75 Hz and 66.75 Hz, we can immediately
see loose correspondence with frequencies which have oscillation
durations that are direct integer multiples of 4.53 ms (calculated
4.53∗N with the given integer multiple [N], 32.75 Hz ≡ 30.53 ms
[4.53∗7]; 39.5 Hz≡ 25.32 ms [4.53∗6]; 46.38 Hz≡ 21.56 ms [4.53∗5];
53.39 Hz ≡ 18.73 ms [4.53∗4]; and 66.75 Hz ≡ 14.98 ms [4.53∗3]).
These correspondences occur with discrepancies (in the time
domain) of 1.18 ms; 1.86 ms; 1.09 ms; 0.61 ms; and 1.39 ms.
Although small relative to frequency, relative to TQM these
oblige reconsideration of TQM with a standard error in the
estimate of 0.52 ms giving an estimate of TQM ranging between
4.01 and 5.05 ms. It is difficult to know where error should be
attributable, perhaps to both frequency and TQM estimates, but
in spite of this, the convergence of these frequencies at, and
interaction with a slow frequency of 6.69 Hz, the 33rd (or 0)
multiple of TQM= 4.53 ms remains convincing.
THE CODING OF COMPLEX SOUND:
STRUCTURAL ANALOGIES WITH VISION
A similar auditory priming paradigm has also been used
to examine the frequencies, and phasic interactions involved
in the dynamic system of auditory binding. The original of
this paradigm, designed by Aksentijevic et al. (2011), evokes
an auditory gamma-band response (aGBR, i.e., a transient
oscillatory brain response evoked by the onset of auditory stimuli
in the range 30–70 Hz, see Pantev et al., 1991), which may be
phase locked to the stimulus by means of stimulus entrainment
(Aksentijevic et al., 2011, 2013, 2014), so essentially identical to
that originally developed by Elliott and colleagues. Entrainment
refers to the alignment in phase, or coupling of two independent
oscillatory systems, in such a way that their periods of oscillation
become related (Cummins, 2009) and in this case, the auditory
stimulus evokes an aGBR that is phase locked to its frequency.
Results have consistently revealed expedited RTs to targets
that comprise frequencies which are fractional multiples of
the entrainment frequency (i.e., are inharmonically related)
compared to those that are harmonically related. Importantly, in
audition these effects appeared to be specific to an entrainment
rate of 33 pps (Aksentijevic et al., 2011, 2013, 2014). This effect is
naturally close to at least one frequency that primes visual binding
mechanisms: the period of a 33 pps entrainment rate is 30.3 ms,
which is close to seven times Q0 (4.53 × 7 = 31.71 ms). More
recently a variation of this paradigm varied the position of the
entrainer tone in the repeating four-tone sequence that predates
target presentation, and so entrainer timing was manipulated in
a similar way to that reported by Elliott (2014) and is evaluable
relative to a 6.69 Hz rhythm. Thus far the data only covers a
narrow range of frequencies. However, analogous effects have
been revealed when the target was presented both in and out
of phase with 6.69 Hz. The target was presented out of phase
with a 6.69 Hz oscillation, in two separate experiments. In both
cases response latencies decreased when the target was presented
at the beginning of the four pip entrainer’s oscillatory trace.
This suggests that primed targets presented out of phase with
a 6.69 Hz rhythm result in responses that are not protentive as
occurs in the visual domain (Elliott, 2014). The target was also
presented, in three separate experiments, in phase with a 6.69 Hz
rhythm, resulting in expedited responses ahead of the first pip
in the entrainer’s oscillatory trace. This suggests that again, as
in visual binding, when there is an interaction in phase with a
6.69 Hz theta rhythm and frequencies in the gamma-band range,
an anticipatory response is revealed for primed targets.
TIME CONSTANCY AND COGNITIVE
ABNORMALITY
It is important to consider the implications of empirical
derivations of such small quanta. Essentially, this question
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concerns the origin and nature of noise. This is particularly
important if frequencies are claimed to be the signature of
functional oscillatory activity in the brain. It is also important
when, for instance, repeated measurements identify ranges of
relevant frequencies, while the neighboring integer multiple of
the quantum concerned lies within or proximal to the range,
although, corresponding variation at the scale of the quantum
leads to a significant lack of precision. There are two questions
that arise from this. The first asks how important reference to
the quantum is if deviations are not only evident but likely?
The second asks, what constitutes a ‘systems failure’ if there are
such deviations. The corollary of this question is at which level
might corrections be made if there is some systematic failure to
maintain coherence between the neurons in a dynamic assembly?
An answer to the first of these questions remains to be seen
but is also open to empirical enquiry. However, TQM may
ultimately be better described not in terms of absolute thresholds
for mental events, derived from a precise, fractional relation
between TQ0 and a given operational quantum but instead in
terms of the higher probability of a given mental event (such
as the perceptual switch from apparent motion to flicker), with
increased probability determined by the increased precision of
the fractional relation between TQ0 and the operative quantum.
With respects to the second question, an appropriate question
to ask is ‘how is the individual managing to do anything
(cognitive) at all?’ At the heart of this question lies the well-
known observation that given some types of brain damage,
commensurate cognitive impairment reduces in severity over
time, and in some cases this involves recruitment of alternative
neural circuits to those originally subserving the cognition
concerned. An example of this reorganization is described by
Foucher et al. (2005), who found anatomically different patterns
of functional connectivity that define the ‘core’ areas of cortex
responsible for coding lexical decision and memory retrieval
in patients with schizophrenia, for whom the core refers to
inter-hemispheric interaction across frontal regions of the brain.
Accepting that frontal brain regions can serve as a form of
generalized processing resource (Duncan and Owen, 2000), the
question remains by virtue of which principle could activity
within frontal regions of cortex come to mimic impaired damage
in other regions of cortex. By virtue of adopting the same basic
dynamic structure perhaps?
Interestingly in this context is the putative connection between
the observed operational quantum at 55 ms and work on
simultaneity thresholds, undertaken initially by Brecher (1932)
and subsequently by Elliott et al. (2007) and subsequently
undertaken with patients with psychosis (Giersch et al., 2009;
Schmidt et al., 2011; see Giersch et al., 2013; Elliott and Giersch,
2016, for reviews). The thresholds for perceived simultaneity
recorded by Brecher were very reliably located at 53 ms and
subsequently, for healthy control participants using a derivation
of Brecher’s paradigm, were found by Elliott et al. (2007) to
be located at 61 ms, 50–69 ms (Giersch et al., 2009), and
51 ms (Schmidt et al., 2011). Interestingly, the patients studies
by Giersch et al. (2009) and Schmidt et al. (2011), revealed
thresholds at close to double those of the healthy controls: in the
case of Giersch et al. (2009), in one condition thresholds located
at 50 ms in controls compare against those at 89 ms for patients
with diagnosis of schizophrenia, while in two other conditions
these values are 59 ms vs. 111 ms and 69 ms vs. 134 ms. For
Schmidt et al. (2011), thresholds located at 51 ms for healthy
controls compare against those located at 85 ms for patients with
a first psychotic episode and 94 ms accompanying a diagnosis of
schizophrenia. In all instances the threshold refers to the point at
which perception switches from the perception of a simultaneity
to the perception of succession and all tasks were completed
successfully. Differences in the location of the threshold between
patients and controls might be attributable to a change in the
operational quantum, although this conclusion would require
more substantive support before qualifying as a reliable scientific
conclusion.
If the brain evolved its anatomical structure in order to
allow neural activities to be performed with the greatest possible
efficiency, it’s reasonable to assume that brain anatomy is a very
general analog to the innumerable (but ordered) interactions
between neurons engaged in cognition. And if interaction is
important then of course brain anatomy will have evolved in
a manner which ensures neural timing is subject to constraints
(manifest in dynamical constants and time universals). All frontal
cortex need do then, to surrogate for damage to other brain
areas, is be able to articulate neurons within the same sets
of temporal constraints that determine interactions within or
between other cortical areas or structures. This seems plausible
although of course the basic idea is almost certainly subject to
more complex modifying constraints. In addition and to the best
of our knowledge this hypothesis remains untested.
This argument suggests that error minimization is one of
the major objectives of the efficient cognitive-neural system, but
at what level should error be minimized, at the level of the
process or at the level of the quantum determining the temporal
operating characteristic of the process? This is a difficult question
to answer in general, largely because there is little evidence of
precisely how the brain functions, metrically, whilst performing
cognitive tasks when damaged, or if obliged to reconfigure
cognition over surrogate neural circuitry. Using an entrainment
paradigm, Seifert et al. (2010) and Elliott et al. (2015) found
blindsight as well as the temporary restoration of visual function
within areas of the visual-blind field occurs following stimulation
with stimuli flickering at very specific frequencies close to, or
within the EEG gamma band. This research is unable to provide
comparative measures of visual performance in the undamaged
brain and so is unable to address the issue of error minimization
by adjustment of process frequency. However and importantly,
this research shows that by knowing which stimulus frequency
promotes blindsight, also allows us to know the frequency able to
partially reverse the effects of blindness.
CONCLUSION
It makes sense to believe that regular, metrical properties of
neural activity determine successful cognition and that cognition
may recover from damage to the neural substrate by virtue of
reconfiguration in surrogate neural substrate, to the extent that
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it is able to reconfigure itself in a regular and metrical pattern.
However, showing this to be the case is an extremely difficult task,
limited in no small way by the immense empirical task of building
and verifying the necessarily metrical and dynamical models of
successful cognitive function. Currently there are only two sets of
relevant and necessarily systematic observations in this field: one
of these reports the precise dynamical structure of the perceptual
systems engaged in dynamical binding across form and time; the
second, derived both empirically from perceptual performance
data, as well as obtained from theoretical models, demonstrates a
timing taxonomy related to a fundamental operator referred to as
the time quantum. Their combination for a complete systematic
examination depends upon a willingness to undertake lengthy
experimental work of seemingly limited overall influence in terms
of citations and publication impact. In addition, as every car
mechanic knows, it is not possible to fit a new timing belt
without lining up the timing marks and this requires an a priori
understanding of the metrical properties of the system to be able
to precisely evaluate hypotheses concerning the generalizability
of taxonomic models of psychophysical and psychophysiological
timing. The problem of a logical circularity may be avoided
if research agendas employed theory such as Geissler’s TQM
as a point of departure. Why is this important? In principle,
an empirical understanding of timing in the dynamics of the
cognitive microstructure is of enormous potential for targeted
and precise treatment (such as that discussed above) for any
abnormality arising at the brain systems level. At the present
time our understanding of how to identify the timing marks are
guided by TQM, but by very little other empirical work. Empirical
support for TQM is confined to studies of apparent motion
with a relationship to studies of oscillatory binding and although
there is an, ‘in principle’ extension of precise metrical models
of cognition to describe other types, including higher-order
cognitive processes, generalization of TQM outside of perception
remains hypothetical and, as such, a topic for future research.
Nevertheless, the point of the current paper is to introduce a
majorly under-represented view of cognition. This view possesses
enormous scope for developing and refining our understanding
of TQM, or a TQM-like model of dynamics in the cognitive
microstructure. It is also importantly relevant to the exploitation
of knowledge on precisely how the cognitive microstructure
is organized dynamically. This might allow development of
therapeutically oriented strategies that allow time and timing to
repair impaired cognitive systems.
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